Human Security Brief: Syria and the Alawites

As a confidential source in Syria told us, with the rise of the al-Sharaa government, Syria has seen an increase of “sectarian violence, opportunistic crime and desire for [that] revenge have converged amid a security vacuum that has left many Syrians afraid to go out at night. Kidnappings — whether for ransom or revenge — happened in more than 13 years of civil war, but the situation poses a major test of the new government’s ability to keep the country stable.” The situation as of July 10 is fluid and remains precarious with opportunities for increasing mass violence against the coastal Alawite population under the justification of defeating remnants of the Assad regime. This is broken down and analyzed below:

Kidnappings

• Following the dissolution of police and security forces after the fall of the Assad regime, new security services still lack the ability to protect individuals in the country is an increasing problem.

• Many of those targeted come from vulnerable Alawite and Sunni communities as sectarian tensions rise in the country. The current regime appears unwilling and unable to de-escalate these sectarian tensions.

• Alawites are blamed for the crimes of the Assad regime, as the Assads themselves were Alawites and a limited number received positions of power within the collapsed regime.

• While some reports from news outlets suggest these are kidnappings for ransom, many Alawite victims’ families report that there has been no contact from the kidnappers about the victims.

• This suggests motives such as sectarian killings to create fear within communities or eliminate believed sectarian enemies. Another possible motivation is vengeance for actions under the Assad regime, but this is unlikely in the case of the Alawites. In at least one case from February, two victims, a father and son, were found two weeks later in a mass grave of other victims.

• The individuals and families targeted come from across the country and include some government employees. However, in Tartous, there appear to be coordinated actions by one or multiple armed groups targeting Alawites.

• In the Homs region, one group has been identified as ‘Shin.’ Nothing else at this time is known about them.

• Most often they are targeted while travelling and on some occasions were in close proximity to government checkpoints. These abductions even occurred in broad daylight. This suggests that the al-Sharaa government possesses both an unwillingness and an inability to wield authority and crack down on the kidnappings.

• This notion is reinforced by the lack of action to help find and return victims of the kidnapping to their families by the government with victims reporting no action after filing missing persons reports.

• The Spectator reports that a some 50-60 women have been kidnapped and raped, with some being sold to important figures within the state government and others being killed. Local police generally refuse to investigate disappearances of Alawite women.

• The situation is ongoing and the number of current kidnapped, killed, or missing is higher than currently reported.

March 7-9 Massacres:

• On March 6, an attack on a government site in the Tartous region saw a number of regime security forces killed. The attackers were alleged to be led by former Assad regime officers and joined by Alwites fired from the government following Assad’s downfall. Regime intelligence officers claim it was an attempted coup. These allegations are unconfirmed at this time.

• The March 7-9 massacre which left over 1,500 Alawites dead and more missing, stemmed from conflicts between Regime forces and aligned militant groups and what appears to be Assad remnants or resistance forces.

• The massacre was executed by over a dozen factions including the government's General Security Service, part of the Interior Ministry; as well as former HTS units such as the Unit 400 fighting force and the Othman Brigade. The victims often appear to have had no ties to the regime—they were killed for being Alawite.

• The government has treated these killings as a one-time event, currently under investigation, but killings have continued to the present day according to Reuters and our sources on the ground.

• The parts of the government’s work and tolerance of the killings likely come from some Alawites' former privileges under Assad and the new government’s stated fears of losing control of the coast to the uprising of Assad supporters. It is worth mentioning that most Alawites did not receive special treatment and are unfairly blamed for the crimes of some under Assad and Assad himself.  

• “A Reuters investigation has pieced together how the massacres unfolded, identifying a chain of command leading from the attackers directly to men who serve alongside Syria’s new leaders in Damascus.” Al-Sharaa himself downplayed the incidents in March, brushing them off as isolated and insignificant.

• Ahmed al-Shami, the governor of Tartous, stated Alawites have not been targets of violence and deserve protection.

June and July:

• Videos from Telegram channels tied to the new Regime on July 7 show forces, mostly appearing to be irregular units, moving towards the coastal regions to continue combat with remnants of the Assad regime.

• Furthermore, these Telegram channels have also blamed the Alawites in the Latakia region, who label the remnants of the Assad regime, for starting the now out-of-control wildfires in the region.

• A video from the coast shows pro-regime forces arresting Alawite men before executing them in the street and leaving their bodies.

• As of July 10th, 12 civilians have been killed or wounded in the East of Syria in the last 24 hours in sectarian or revenge-related attacks.

As stated the situation along the coast is liable to escalate into widespread mass killings by forces of and aligned with the al-Sharaa regime. Kidnappings as well as retribution for the wildfires, currently blamed on Alawites, will continue. The al-Sharaa will be able to justify their actions under the guise of eliminating remnants of the Assad regime, placing a blanket label on Alawites as the remainder of the collapsed government. This threatens the stability of the regime as it erodes trust in the notion that the new government will be less oppressive and provide security and representation for the people of Syria.