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China Steps In: Mediation Efforts in Sudan’s Power Struggle
- Dr. Nadia Helmy
- Oct 11
- 5 min read
China's diplomatic discourse regarding the current crisis in Sudan revolves around the need for a political solution, dialogue between the two parties, a ceasefire, and a return to the framework agreement.
China’s diplomatic and political discourse regarding the current crisis in Sudan revolves around the need for a political solution, dialogue between the two parties to the conflict, the establishment of a ceasefire, and a return to the framework agreement signed by the concerned parties in December 2022. It also calls for reducing the humanitarian suffering of the Sudanese people. China categorically rejects any vote on sanctions against the parties to the conflict, or any such vote in the UN Security Council. This position is consistent with China’s previous position since the era of former President Omar al-Bashir. The Chinese government is keen to dispatch a special envoy for the Horn of Africa affairs to Sudan to deepen communication with the concerned parties within Sudan and the region. In late 2022, China held a conference on “Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa” in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, with the aim of increasing communication and dialogue with the countries of the region to resolve security and economic issues and find immediate and urgent solutions.
Considering that stability in Sudan serves Chinese interests in the face of growing Western and American influence, Beijing seeks to play a role in bringing the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese army closer, similar to its successful mediation in numerous issues, such as the normalization of Saudi-Iranian relations. Beijing is concerned about the future of its projects, interests, and Chinese labor, as Khartoum is China’s third-largest trading partner in Africa after South Africa and Angola and is also the sixth-largest oil exporter to Beijing.
Although Sudan has been one of China’s most important partners on the African continent for many years, these economic interests began to decline after the secession of South Sudan in 2011, which seized approximately 75% of Sudan’s oil reserves.However, Sudan has remained a focus of interest for China, given its strategic location on the African continent, its demographic weight, and its ongoing political and security instability, which could contaminate the entire Horn of Africa region, with which China has strategic partnerships and extensive interests.
Since the outbreak of war in Sudan, China has not taken a negative stance. Beijing has called on the warring parties to calm down and sit at the negotiating table. However, it has not announced its desire to mediate, and the Beijing government has not sought to offer any initiative for a solution, emphasizing “reconciliation diplomacy,” which has become a new approach in Chinese foreign policy. This Chinese position stems from a broad-eyed, analytical, and insightful reading of the political landscape within Sudan and an understanding of its dimensions, entanglements, and complexities. The story is not simply a conflict between two parties seeking to seize power or a conflict between a legitimate authority and armed militias. Rather, it is an international conflict that could turn Sudan into another arena for confrontation, replicating the Ukrainian model there, something China fears.
China seeks to limit the spillover of conflicts into South Sudan, recognizing that the Horn of Africa region is characterized by security fragility and that any conflict there could spill over into neighboring countries. Consequently, the expansion of instability in the region and within Sudan threatens China’s direct interests in the region, especially South Sudan, which is a key partner in supplying China with African oil. In addition, China had a number of its citizens working in Sudan before the crisis, estimated at hundreds, and evacuated them after the situation there escalated.
Relations between China and the legitimate government in Sudan became strained in May 2025, following the Sudanese government’s demand for a clear explanation from its Chinese counterpart regarding the arrival of Chinese-made suicide and strategic drones in the hands of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) loyal to its arch-enemy, Hemedti.Especially since the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces’ possession of such Chinese weapons threatens Sudan’s national security, as they are used to threaten Sudanese security and stability by targeting and destroying vital facilities, such as hospitals, electricity and water stations, and fuel depots inside Sudan. They also commit crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law by bombing hotels, unarmed civilians, and health facilities, and killing women and children.
To this end, in April 2025, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in Port Sudan, the country’s temporary capital, and asked him for an official Chinese explanation regarding how the Rapid Support Forces obtained Chinese “FH-95” strategic drones. But the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires confirmed that his country had no connection to the Rapid Support Forces, headed by “Hemedti.”
On the other hand, China’s official position on the Sudanese war is its commitment to a policy of non-direct intervention with a focus on supporting Sudan’s stability to preserve its economic interests, particularly in the energy sector. Despite Chinese dissatisfaction with sanctions violations and the supply of weapons to parties to the conflict, China continues to rely on an indirect mediation role with non-Western parties, avoiding negative intervention that might conflict with its interests with its partners or provoke the United States. China maintains its comprehensive support for the Sudanese government as a sovereign state. China supports Sudan’s sovereignty and its policy of non-interference in its internal affairs. China is internationally recognized for its adherence to the principle of respecting the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs. China has also been keen to support the Sudanese government in its conflict with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army over the past years. Since South Sudan’s independence in 2011, China has affirmed its absolute commitment to maintaining strong relations with Khartoum and has continued to support development efforts in Sudan.China has also played a significant role in exploiting Sudan’s resources, especially oil, by providing large loans for investment in Sudanese infrastructure and pipeline construction. Beijing also took advantage of Chevron’s withdrawal from Sudan to expand its investments in the oil sector.
Here, Chinese diplomacy operates according to the principle of “leveraging indirect relations.” In light of the current crisis within Sudan, China avoids any direct intervention, preferring to employ “backseat diplomacy.” China also supports mediation by other parties, such as the United Nations, the African Union, and other countries, rather than directly engaging in any intervention, even if accompanied by peace, which could damage its international reputation in the eyes of its competitors, most notably the United States. China avoids conflicts with its partners, particularly the United States, regarding its involvement in the Sudanese issue. Here, China avoids creating contradictions between its political agenda in Sudan and the agendas of its regional partners, such as Russia and the Gulf states. It is also noteworthy that China, in particular, has avoided provoking the United States regarding the Sudan issue, which is not of major strategic importance to it.
While human rights organizations such as Amnesty International are monitoring the UAE’s supply of weapons to Sudan, including Chinese weapons, in flagrant violation of the arms embargo on Darfur, a number of human rights and international organizations have held China responsible for preventing the diversion of its weapons to conflict zones while seeking to strengthen its position by supporting peace processes.
Based on the above analysis, we understand China’s keenness to support peace and stability in Sudan and end the conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. China is also keen to safeguard its sprawling economic interests within Sudan and in the neighboring Horn of Africa region. China fears that the situation within Sudan could turn into an arena for regional and international conflict that would harm its interests and therefore remains neutral.
© 2025 Modern Diplomacy
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